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The approximation from below by the Crouzeix-Raviart element for the Steklov eigenvalue problem

H. Bi, Y. D. Yang


In this paper we propose and study maintenance service contracts for a warranted equipment. We consider a situation where an agent offers several service contract options and the owner of equipment (a company) has to select the optimal option which maximizes its profit. This case is typically found in the industry where the Original Equipment Manufacturing is the only maintenance service provider. Since a high equipment availability is needed for gaining some revenue, availibility target should be considered as a performance measure in the service contract options. We study the maintenance service contract considering imperfect maintenance and the availability target from both the owner and OEM point of views and use a non-cooperative game formulation to determine the optimal strategy (pricing structure) for the OEM and the optimal option for the owner.


Availability, imperfect maintenance, service contract, warranty, non-cooperative game theory.

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